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FOREWORD
"THIS YEAR'S REFORM IS NEXT YEAR'S
NEED FOR REFORM"
NAHUM LIlT·

The hallmark of the administrative process must be its fairness
whenever it resolves disputes over governmental rights and benefits
or otherwise arbitrates or adjudicates the private rights of citizens.
The ultimate question that must eventually be answered is whether
such fairness requires a federal Article I judiciary. Present efforts by
states to enhance the perception of fairness of the administrative pro
cess have focused upon the administrative law judge system. What is
apparent, however, is that governments in general have not yet come
to terms with the level of process in the system required to guarantee
fairness or the appearance of fairness. The purpose of this sympo
sium is to place the current problems in perspective and to identify
the issues that must be addressed in the coming years.
After nearly ten years of debate, and under increased pressure
from the courts to impose elements of simple fairness in cases where
individuals could be deprived of rights by the government, the fed
• Chief Administrative Law Judge, United States Department of Labor; Chief
Administrative Law Judge, Civil Aeronautics Board, 1977-79; Administrative Law
Judge, Federal Power Commission, 1970-77; Attorney, Interstate Commerce Commis
sion, Office of General Counsel, 1965-70; Office of Proceedings, 1960-65. A.B., Cornell
University, 1956; LL.B., Columbia University School of Law, 1959.
The views expressed in this article are those of the author and no approval or en
dorsement by the United States Department of Labor is intended or should be inferred.
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eral Administrative Procedure Act of 1946 1 was enacted. That stat
ute provides for a system whereby administrative hearings would be
conducted by disinterested persons, generally administrative law
judges where the agency heads were unable to try cases themselves,2
and where there would be a strict separation of functions) - ensur
ing equal access at the same time in the same manner to all persons
addressing the ultimate administrative decisionmaker.
In 1946, the world of administrative law primarily was peopled
with independent regulatory agencies handling economic regulation,
whether as licensing and rulemaking (including setting of rates) or
enforcement to ensure that the public trust was not being abused, the
Securities and Exchange Commission, for example. A far different
world exists today where ninety percent of the cases handled by
agencies are simple adjudications: Social Security claims, Black
Lung claims, Longshore and Harbor Workers' Act proceedings,
Whistleblowers, CETA's etc. Only fifteen percent of the judges cur
rently employed are in economic regulation or in the general regula
tion of businesses and business practices. This has resulted in a
growth of administrative adjudications which directly touch the pub
lic as against the economic regulation which, while real, was distant
and remote. 4
Significant stress has been placed upon a system originally
designed in 1946 to permit large economic regulatory agencies with
relatively small adjudicative staffs to determine major economic is
sues. Management has not come to grips with rationally supplying
the large amount of resources necessary to meet their needs and al
most all of the growth has been in new agencies. And the growth
continues. Few statutes creating rights for individuals omit the re
quirement that a dispute be settled on the record by APA judges.
The current immigration bill on the House side now being consid
ered by the Congress provides for such determinations. S The dispute
I. Ch. 324, 60 Stat. 237 (current version at 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559,701-706, 1305,
3105,3344,6362,7562 (1982».
2. 5 U.S.c. § 556(b) (1982).
3. ld. § 554(d).
4. Over 300,000 claims are processed annually by the judges at the Office of Hear
ings and Appeals at the Social Security Administration, Department of Health and
Human Services, and over 10,000 at the Department of Labor under the longshoremen's
and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 901-950 (1976 &: Supp. V 1981)
and Black Lung Benefits Act, 30 U.S.C. §§ 901-945 (1976 &: Supp. V 1981). The chances
of a citizen coming into direct contact with the Departments of Labor and Health and
Human Services, or with a party involved in an adjudication, becomes very high.
5. H.R. IS 10, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983); see also S. 529, 98th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1983)(Simpson &: Mazolli BiU).
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over the fair housing laws,6 in fact, centers upon whether disinter
ested administrative law judges will hear those cases or whether they
will continue to be heard in the over-burdened federal district
courts.'
Congress has addressed the problems of the independence of
administrative law judges in three separate statutes over the last ten
years. It has created, in each instance, a use of judges as a true Arti
cle I judiciary by having the decisionmaking authority reside in dif
ferent hands than those charged with policy.8 All three instances
involve programs within the Department of Labor. In each case, the
Department of Labor has retained the policy, rulemaking, and ad
ministrative authorities, but adjudications have been moved to either
independent agencies, such as the Federal Mine Safety Review
Commission and the Occupational Safety and Health Review Com
mission, or to an agency housed within the Department, the Benefits
Review Board, but maintaining a large degree of internal indepen
dence. 9 Appeals from decisions of these bodies are directly to appel
late circuits. lO
Congress's experimentation is by no means complete. We are
witnesSing today another of the grand movements in American poli
tics where power and authority shift between the Executive Branch
and the Congress. That shift has resulted in the last few years in a
diminution of the power of the independent regulatory agencies and
increase in the authority of the Executive Branch. Whereas twenty
years ago the chairman of an independent regulatory agency was
generally elected by his colleagues, today he is a Presidential ap
pointee. It is not just a determination to reduce the level of regula
tion or to redirect the regulatory thrust, but a determination that
those making decisions will be more responsive to the President than
to the Congress. In almost every agency, the chairman now has a
permanent appointment and has been vested with the entire power
of the administration. The individual issues which are now being
debated concerning administrative justice at both the state and fed
6. See S. 1220, 98th Cong., 1st Scss. (1983)(proposed title: Fair Housing Amend
ment of 1983).
7. See Uf. § 6.
8. Federal Mine, Safety &. Health Review Commission, 30 U.S.C. § 823 (Supp. V
1981); Benefits Review Board, 33 U.S.c. § 92 I (b) (1976); Occupational Safety &. Health
Review Commission, 29 U.S.c. § 661 (1976 &. Supp. V 1981).
9. 30 U.S.C. § 823 (Supp. V 1981); 33 U.S.C. 921(b)(3) (1976); 29 U.S.c. § 661
(1976 &. Supp. V 1981).
10. 30 U.S.C. § 816 (Supp. V 1981); 33 U.S.C. § 921(c) (1976); 29 U.S.C. § 660
(1976).
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eral level must be viewed in the context of these shifting overall
political balances and the effects that these shifts are having.
The accountability of judges is the second area of major activ
ity. Concern for accountability has manifested in two areas. First in
the implementation of peer review over the discipline of administra
tive law judges, and second, in a spate of cases seeking to discipline
or remove judges for what one agency - the Social Security Admin
istration - claims is a failure of judges to adequately perform their
duties and functions. Several cases against judges are pending, and,
as Professor Rosenblum notes in his analysis of the controversy over
the APA standards of "good cause," implementation of any standard
must be done in a manner consistent with the enhancement of the
judge's independence and must not jeopardize his role.
None of the issues concerning a unified corps of administrative
law judges at the state or federal levels is new. l l The issues are fun
damental, however, and are not a question of fine tuning of a system
already working well. There have been numerous aberrations
which, in the aggregate, may have caused the public to doubt
whether those who try cases are in fact impartial and removed from
the political exigencies that may skew their decisions away from
solely those facts on the record and the applicable law. It is funda
mental, for instance, whether or not judges are housed in the agen
cies that employ them. If the agency perceives that it has an ability
to control its judges through its rules, and the public perceives that
the agency insists on appointing only those that are "sensitive" or
"responsive" to its needs, the public is not likely to perceive the sys
tem as fair.
Over the years the issues concerning a unified corps, how judges
perform their function or how they are held accountable, which is
the main thrust of the articles in this review, have operated on the
assumption that an overriding necessity of the system is to maintain
subject matter expertise. This enshrinement of one factor, albeit an
important one, distorts the system's primary objective - the expedi
tious disposition of proceedings under a system that is fair and is
believed by the public to be fair. The current system is not necessar
ily unfair in any given case, and the vast majority of cases that are
disposed of are handled without great upset. But if one looks to the
Congressional oversight hearings which periodically examine
whether agencies are abiding by the requirements of non-interfer
11. See

s. Doc.

No. 248. 79th Cong.• 2d Sess. (1937). reprinted in LEGISLATIVE
ACT OF 1946. at 41-42 (1946).
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ence with judges, there is a persistent trend in these reports showing
an involvement which is not only unfair but frequently may border
on the improper. The most recent report of the Senate Subcommittee
on Social Security is only one of several reports about various agen
cies over many years, including the Federal Trade Commission and
the Interstate Commerce Commission, which display "unusual"
agency involvement,12
At the bottom, if subject matter expertise can be protected, no
one could argue against reforms which will result in an enhancement
of the public perception of fairness. This is where the debate princi
pally lies, not in the obvious efficiencies of the use of personnel and
physical resources, not in the petty concerns of some judges as to
whether their current lifestyle is good or not good in their current
agencies, not in the determination of chief judges as to what is com
fortable for them personally, and not in an agency wanting its own
procedural rules to enhance its own attorneys' chances of success or
that it is good to bring one's own "sensitive" umpire to court.
Nor should we forget that this debate will not end merely be
cause a "reform" is put in place today. There is no single answer that
works well in every instance to balance how judges can be independ
ent and accountable. There is no good answer to the question of how
one evaluates a judge who is slow. Can anyone say that the judge
who decides and issues forty cases a month but twenty come back on
remand is better or worse than the judge who issues fifteen decisions
a month and none are reversed? But, there can be no gainsaying that
self-policing and peer review are better handled in the context of a
unified corp or separate corp of judges than they are in situations
where an agency having a stake in the outcome of a proceeding will
be both the prosecutor, and possibly the judge, of the judge.
Several of the articles in this symposium are devoted in one
form or another to the question of the hona-fides of a unified corps
system - focused at this point on the federal government's possible
experiment because of the introduction by Senator Howard Hefiin of
Senate bill 1275. 13 Several examine the state systems. This debate
has been of great concern to the states, eight of which have passed
varying degrees of a unified corps concept and two of which, New
12. See SUBCOMM. ON OVERSIGHT OF GOV'T MANAGEMENT OF THE SENATE
COMM. ON Gov'TAL AFFAlR.S, THE ROLE OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE IN THE
TITLE II SOCIAL SECUR.ITY DISABILITY INSURANCE PROGRAM, S. REp. No. Ill, 98th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1983).
13. 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983); 129 CONGo REc. S6610-13 (daily ed. May 12,
1983).
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Jersey and Minnesota, have a corps which present models of how a
unified system would work. 14 The most interesting aspect of this de
bate is that outside of the small "old boy" network of interested
judges and agencies that hire administrative law judges, few mem
bers of the public - those who will be most affected by the outcome
of the debate - are either interested or knowledgeable. What has
been true so often in many of the areas that reflect a significant
change in how the public will be treated, is that the debate is now
being conducted necessarily with the view of those most affected in
mind. There may be a groundswell of public opinion to stop the So
cial Security Administration from arbitrarily throwing off the disa
bility roles disabled Americans, but, when the "hurt" stops, the cry
for fixing the problem diminishes rapidly. Each of the reforms
within the last decade has come because of strong interest groups
having an issue and wanting their problem re-addressed. There are
few public interest groups, however, which have reform of adminis
trative procedures high on their list of priorities, and, more likely,
most are not interested in pressing the point if it is to the detriment
of their other principal issues. I would like to think that the large
amount of writing on the subject is due to a general interest that has
not been evidenced in the past rather than the fact that there are
large numbers of law professors to write on the subject and a degree
of visibility of administrative law judges which was not quite as evi
dent in the past. I know better.

14. M. RICH & W. BRUCAR. THE CENTRAL PANEL SYSTEM FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
LAW JUDGES: A SURVEY OF SEVEN STATES 2 (1983).

